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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
Priority No. 2

v.

:

MISTY DAWN SEGURA,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 990814-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft, a second degree felony, in violation
of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-6-404, 76-6-412 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction under
UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996 & Supp. 1999).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Where the jury instructions as a whole instructed that the State must
prove the essential allegations of theft beyond a reasonable doubt, did the trial court
commit plain error by not sua sponte referring to the State's burden again in the
accomplice liability instruction?
In the absence of any objection to the trial court's instructions, error may be
assigned only in order to avoid manifest injustice. State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439,445
(Utah 1996); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 178 (Utah App. 1992). See also Utah R.

Crim. P. 19(c) ("... Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice.''1). In reviewing a claim of manifest
injustice, the appellate court uses the "same standards when determining the presence
of plain error. Arguelles, 921 P.2d at 445. Thus, to constitute manifest injustice, "it
should have been obvious to the trial court that it was committing error." Id.
2. Is the jury verdict for theft supportable?
An appellate court will not reverse on grounds of insufficient evidence "[w]here
there is any evidence, including reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, from ~
which findings of all elements of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt[.]"
State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). See State v. ColwelU 2000 UT 8 \ 4042, 994 P.2d 177 (same).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah R. Crim. P. 19 (c):
No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating
distinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection.
Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to
instructions in order to avoid a manifest injustice.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1999):
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests,
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for
such conduct.
2

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999):
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over
the property of another with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with theft, a second degree felony. Following a jury trial
on 27 October 1999, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 62). The trial court imposed
the statutory term of from one to fifteen years (R. 80-81). The trial court then suspended
the sentence and ordered defendant to serve 14 days in the Salt Lake County Jail and
placed her on probation (id.). Defendant's appeal is timely (R. 84).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Defendant intentionally aided in the theft of two automobiles from the Salt Lake
County Airport Alamo Rent-A-Car, where she worked shuttling returned rental cars.
Late in the afternoon of 23 October 1998, a former Alamo employee, Chastity
Quintana, drove into the Alamo return lanes with two cohorts (R. 97:30-31). Chastity
approached Jennifer Gotberg, an Alamo employee who was checking in returning rental
cars (R. 97:31-32). Chastity asked Jenniffer if she would let her take a vehicle from the
return lanes in exchange for a "a bag of weed"(/#). Jenniffer refused and resumed
checking in the returning rentals (R. 97:33).
After being refused by Jenniffer, Chastity approached Angela Segura, another
Alamo employee who was checking in cars that afternoon (R. 97:33, 65). As with
Jenniffer, Chastity asked Angela "if she could steal a car," in exchange for "weed" (R.
3

97:65). Angela said, "No, I don't want to get into trouble for it" (id.). While Angela was
refusing to assist Chastity, defendant drove up in a black Mitsubishi Eclipse, property of
Alamo Rent-A-Car, and parked behind Chastity's car (R. 97:66-67).* Defendant got out
of the Eclipse and approached Chastity who asked her, "Hey is that all right if I steal a
car?"and again offered to exchange "weed" (R. 97:67). Defendant replied, "I don't know
about that" (R. 97:68). Overhearing defendant's equivocal reply to Chastity, Angela
decided she wanted nothing further to do with it, and left the area (R. 97:67-68).
Jenniffer also overheard a portion of the conversation between Chastity and
defendant; specifically, she overheard defendant telling Chastity to meet her at the stop
sign (R. 97:34-35).
Following this exchange, Chastity got back into the car in which she had arrived,
defendant got into the Eclipse, and both parties drove out of sight (R.97:37-38, 70).
Between five and ten minutes passed before either Angela or Jenniffer saw defendant
again (R. 97:39, 70-71). Defendant returned to the rental return area on foot, and upon
approaching Jenniffer, "looked at [her] and brought her finger to her lips, saying "shhhh"
(R. 97:40).
As defendant's and Angela's shifts were then complete, they left work together (R.
97:71). On the drive home, defendant told Angela that "they" took the black Mitsubishi
Eclipse and a Blazer (R. 97:72-73, 101). Defendant told Angela that Chastity and her

defendant and Angela Segura are sisters-in-law (R. 97:61).
4

friends were going to Las Vegas in the stolen automobiles, and also asked Angela not to
tell anyone about the thefts (id.).
Approximately two hours after the thefts, Jenniffer informed her supervisor about
the incident (R. 97:51). Jenniffer's supervisor told assistant manager, Kenneth Pressley
(R. 97:84). However, Pressley was unable to confirm that the vehicles were missing until
the following day, when upon conducting an inventory he discovered that a Mitsubishi
Eclipse, valued at $22,000, and a Mitsubishi Montero (not a Chevy Blazer), valued at
$28,000, were missing and that there was no record of these vehicles being rented or in
any other way being removed under the authorization of Alamo (R. 97:85-87). Pressley
talked with the defendant the next morning, Sunday October 25, concerning the missing
vehicles (R. 97:89). Defendant denied any knowledge of the theft until Pressley told her
that he had witnesses to her involvement in making sure that Chastity was able to get the
cars (R. 97:90). Defendant then admitted that Chastity had taken the cars, but denied
having seen her do it (id.).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Point I. Defendant fails to demonstrate any error, let alone plain error or manifest
injustice, in the trial court's failure to sua sponte include in its accomplice liability
instruction a reminder regarding the State's burden to prove such beyond a reasonable
doubt. Indeed, the jury instructions as a whole were adequate to inform the jury of the

5

essential allegations charged in the Theft Information and the State's attendant burden of proof.
Point II. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict, and drawing
reasonable inferences therefrom, the evidence establishes that defendant was more than
an idle bystander to the Alamo Rent-A-Car thefts. Rather, defendant intentionally aided
Chastity and her cohorts in the successful thefts.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BECAUSE THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AS A WHOLE WERE
ADEQUATE TO INFORM THE JURY THAT THE STATE MUST
PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL ALLEGATIONS OF THE THEFT
CHARGE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, DEFENDANT
FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE THAT THE TRIAL COURT PLAINLY
ERRED IN NOT SUA SPONTE REMINDING THE JURY OF THE
STATE'S BURDEN IN THE ACCOMPLICE LIABILITY
INSTRUCTION
In point I of his brief, defendant claims that the trial court committed manifest
injustice by not sua sponte including within the accomplice liability instruction a
reminder that the State must prove its accomplice liability theory against defendant
beyond a reasonable doubt. Aplt. Br. at 10. As defendant raised no objection to the jury
instructions below, it is his burden to establish plain error on appeal, or that: "(i) [a]n
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful." State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 318 (Utah 1998) (quoting, State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201,1208 (Utah 1993)). See State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439,445 (Utah 1996)

6

(recognizing that manifest injustice cannot be established absent obvious error).
Defendant's plain error claim fails all three prongs of the plain error analysis.
A.

Proceedings Below

Defendant was jointly charged with Chastity Quintana for the Alamo auto thefts
(R. 2). Defendant was tried alone, however, on the theory that Chastity was the principal
actor, but defendant aided and abetted in thefts (R. 97:120-135). Defendant maintained
that her own conduct, while less than exemplary, did not rise to that of an accomplice (R.
97:129-130). However, her defense assumed that: (a) Chastity was the principal actor in
the auto thefts; and/or that (b) Chastity's conduct was unauthorized by Alamo (R. 97:99109). Thus, trial counsel's closing argument emphasized that the State had not proven
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant intentionally aided Chastity and her cohorts in
the auto thefts (R. 97:126-129).
Although well aware of the State's accomplice liability theory, and its attendant
burden of proof, defendant raised no objection to proposed instructions on the elements of
theft or accomplice liability, or to any other of the proposed jury instructions {see R.
97:110-117). Accordingly, the jury was instructed, in separate instructions, on the
elements of theft (R. 36 (instr. #11)), accomplice liability (R. 32 (instr. #7)), aw/that the
State had the burden of proving each of the essential allegations in the Information
beyond a reasonable doubt {see R. 28 (instr. #3)) and (R. 39 (instr. #14)). Because
defendant was tried alone, and because it was undisputed that Chastity and her cohorts
7

were the principal actors in the auto thefts, the jury was also instructed, without objection,
not to concern themselves with the status of any other person or defendant named in the
case other than defendant (R. 33 (instr. #8)). Finally, the jury was instructed to consider
the instructions as a whole (R. 48 (instr. #23)).2
B.

The Jury Instructions Were Not Erroneous

The State does not dispute that it had the burden of proving defendant's
accomplice liability beyond a reasonable doubt. Cf. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT App 24,
^11, 980 P.2d 191 (concluding that the group criminal activities penalty enhancement
created a new accomplice liability crime which must be proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt). Nor does the State claim that the instructions regarding that burden in
this case are a model of clarity. However, while the instant instructions could have been
more artful, as demonstrated above, the jury was informed of all the essential allegations
of accomplice liability (R. 32 (instr. #7)), and the State's responsibility to prove such
beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 28 (instr. #3); R. 39 (instr. #14)).
Because the instant instructions were adequate as a whole to inform the jury of the
essential allegations of the Information and the State's burden to prove such beyond a
reasonable doubt, this is not a case like State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980), cited by
defendant. In Laine, the supreme court held that the trial court's failure to include the
intent element in the basic "elements" instruction constituted reversible error. Id. at 35.
2

The pertinent jury instructions are contained in the addendum.
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The basic elements instruction in Laine instructed the jurors regarding the State's burden
to prove each element listed there beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Even though the intent
element was included in the general Information instruction, the Information instruction
said nothing about the State's burden to prove the elements listed therein beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. Therefore, other than the elements instruction (from which the
intent element was missing), no other instruction told the Laine jurors that they had to
find all the essential allegations of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
This case is similar to Laine, but it is also fundamentally distinguishable. As with
the intent element in Laine, the accomplice liability elements in this case were not
included with the theft elements in a single basic "elements" instruction (R. 32 (instr.
#7)); (R. 36 (instr. #11)), but were listed in a separate instruction. Moreover, the
accomplice liability instruction did not include a statement regarding the State's burden to
prove such beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 32 (instr. #7)). However, unlike Laine, and as
noted previously, the jury in this case was given an additional instruction that it was the
State's burden to prove all the essential allegations in the Information beyond a
reasonable doubt (R. 28 (instr. #3)). The result in Laine turns on the absence of just such
an instruction. Laine, 618 P.2d at 35. Were it otherwise, the supreme court would not
have clarified that it did "not mean to imply that all of the elements of the charged crime
must necessarily be contained in one instruction[.]" Id. at 35. Indeed, the important
consideration under Laine is that the instructions as a whole are adequate to inform the
9

jury "what each element is and that each must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
Because the instant instructions, read as whole, set forth the accomplice liability elements
and tht State's responsibility to prove such beyond a reasonable doubt, they do not
amount to error under Laine?
Defendant further complains, that the trial court instructed the jury that they were
not to be concerned with the status of any other person or defendant other than defendant
herself. Aplt. Br. at 17. However, such an instruction is common in multiple defendant
cases. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-203(2) (1999) ("In any prosecution in which an
actor's criminal responsibility is based on the conduct of another, it is no defense . . .
[t]hat the person for whose conduct the actor is criminally responsible has been acquitted,
has not been prosecuted or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or of a
different type or class of offense or is immune from prosecution."). Here, for whatever

defendant acknowledges that State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 291 (Utah 1986), is not
directly on point. Aplt. Br. at 19. Harmon deals with a question of preserved error in
relation to a claimed erroneous attempt instruction. Id. at 291. In Harmon, the trial court
refused defendant's proffered instruction on the elements of attempted robbery, and
instead merely inserted the word "attempted" before the word "robbery" in the previously
prepared robbery instruction, and read it to the jury as an instruction on the lesser
included offense of attempted robbery. Id. at 291. As a result, the Harmon trial court
"wholly failed" to instruct the jurors on the basic elements of attempted robbery. Id. at
292. Harmon was thereafter convicted of attempted robbery, but given the deficient
instruction, there was no way to determine whether the jury properly found each element
of attempted robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Harmon was therefore given a new
trial. Id. As demonstrated above, the instant jury was instructed as to all the necessary
elements, albeit, in separate instructions.
10

reason, defendant's case was handled separately from any prosecution of Chastity and her
cohorts. However, it was undisputed and assumed at trial that Chastity was the principal
actor in the Alamo car thefts (R. 97:97-109, 125-130). Therefore, it is not reasonably
likely that the jury was confused by the instruction in this case.
That Chastity's participation as the principal actor was undisputed (see R. 97:97109, 125-130), also answers defendant's allegation that the trial court should have sua
sponte instructed the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that another person
committed the thefts before it could convict defendant as an accomplice. Aplt. Br. at 20.
Given the facts of this case, counsels' closing arguments, and the jury instructions as a
whole, the jury could not find beyond a reasonable that defendant had obtained the
property of another if they reasonably doubted (a) that she aided Chastity or (b) that
Chastity committed theft. There was therefore no need for a specific instruction to that
effect. See, e.g., State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d 1287, 1292 (Utah App. 1994) (failure to
instruct on element was harmless where the trial testimony clearly and indisputably
established that element), cert, denied, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995). In support of her claim,
defendant cites cases where the giving of an aiding and abetting instruction was held to be
error because evidence as to the principal substantive offense was disputed and/or non-

11

existent. See, e.g., State v. Scott, 732 P.2d 117, 119 (Utah 1987); State v. Pacheco, 492
P.2d 1347, 1348 (Utah 1972). This authority is unavailing on these facts.4
In sum, Chastity's participation as the principal actor was an assumption of trial.
Therefore, there was no necessity to sua sponte instruct the jury that they must find
Chastity's was the principal actor beyond a reasonable doubt before they could convict
defendant as an accomplice.
C.

Any Error Could Not Have Been Obvious

Even if the separate instructions here were erroneous in some manner, that error
could not have been obvious to the trial court. "Obvious" means "easily discovered, seen,
or understood; evident."

WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY

793 (1975).

Indeed, the trial court might reasonably have relied on Laine's teaching that all the
essential elements do not necessarily have to be included in a single instruction. Id. at 35.
As discussed above, this case is not Laine revisited because the instructions as a whole in
this case were adequate to inform the jury (a) of all the essential elements of accomplice
liability; and (b) of the State's burden to prove the essential allegations of the Information

defendant also cites State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, 989 P.2d 1091, which
which involved a prosecution for rape of a child as an accomplice, but which raised a
question different from that raised here. At issue in Chaney was the mens rea for
accomplice liability which issue was ultimately resolved on grounds of invited error. Id.
at \ 55. While the accomplice liability instruction in Chaney did include a requirement
that the jury find the principal actor had sexual intercourse with the child-victim, id. at ^
53, n.5, such was required there because Chaney disputed that the principal actor (the
child-victim's purported husband), had actually raped the child-victim. Id. at ^ 20, 28.
Thus, Chaney, like Scott and Pacheco is unavailing on these facts.
12

beyond a reasonable doubt (see R. 28 (instr. #3), R. 32 (instr. #7), R. 39 (instr. #14)).
Given this circumstance, the trial court had no reason to think the instructions were
obviously erroneous under Laine.
Moreover, Chaney was decided on 28 October 1999, three months after the instant
trial (R. 59), and could not have served as a model in formulating the accomplice liability
instruction here. See State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 804 n.5 (Utah App.) ("Plain error is
determined under legal standards applicable at the time of trial/') (citing Dunn, 850 P.2d
at 1228), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88 (Utah 1998).
Based on the above, any error would not have been obvious to the trial court.
Indeed, it was not obvious to trial counsel who, though well aware of the State's burden
to prove defendant's accomplice liability beyond a reasonable doubt (R. 97:125-130),
raised no objection to the separate instructions here (R. 97:110-117). Defendant, who is
represented on appeal by the same firm that handled her defense at trial (see R. 7), makes
no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in conjunction with her claim of plain error.
See State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900, 906 (Utah App. 1994) (observing that if error should
have been plain to the court, it should also have been plain to trial counsel, who should
have raised an objection), vacated on other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996). Cf.
State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 712, 719 (Utah App. 1997) (recognizing that "if an n error was not
obvious to the trial court, it most likely was not obvious to trial counsel").

13

D.

No Prejudice

For the same reasons defendant fails to establish error, let alone obvious error, she
fails to establish prejudice. Defendant's claim of prejudice is based on the erroneous
assumption that she has demonstrated an instructional error and is therefore entitled to
reversal as a matter of law under Laine and progeny. Aplt. Br. at 22. However, for the
reasons stated in subpoints (B) and (C) above, defendant fails to demonstrate that the jury
instructions as whole in this case were inadequate. She therefore fails to demonstrate that
she is entitled to reversal as a matter of law under Laine.
In any event, even assuming there were some error in the instructions here, any
error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1,
119 S.Ct.1827, 1837 (1999) (holding that "the omission of an element is an error that is
subject to harmless-error analysis"). The test for determining whether the error is
harmless "is whether it appears 'beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of
did not contribute to the verdict obtained.'" Id. (citing Chapman v. California, 386
U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). Even an error in the unanimity instruction may be harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt where "the jury necessarily found beyond a reasonable doubt" every
required element of the crime. Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 228 (Utah App. 1993)
(Stewart, J. dissenting). See also Stevenson, 884 P.2d at 1292 (failure to instruct on
element was harmless where the trial testimony clearly and indisputably established that
element).
14

Defendant suggests that this Court is not bound by Neder and may choose not to
engage in a harmless error analysis as a matter of state law. Aplt. Br. at 23-24 (citing
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265 (Utah 1993), and Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 10).
However, should the Court deem it necessary to reach this question, defendant fails to
articulate any reason for departing from the federal harmless-error analysis in this case.
Cf. State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219,1221 n.8 (Utah 1988) (reasoning that state constitution
may be interpreted differently from federal constitution in order to protect Utahn's "from
the vagaries of inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal
courts").
Nor has defendant shown that absent Neder's teaching, harmless-error review
would be inappropriate as a matter of state law. As set forth above, Laine does not
necessarily require reversal where, as here, the essential elements are given in separate
instructions. Id. at 35. Moreover, any claim of instructional error with regard to
Chastity's participation is necessarily harmless because her conduct as the principal actor
was uncontroverted at trial. See, e.g., Tillman, 855 P.2d at 228; Stevenson, 884 P.2d at
1292. See also State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35ffl|27-31, 392 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (error in
failing to instruct jury regarding penalty enhancement offense, that they must find all
three defendants acted "in concert with two or more persons," to be "without legal
consequence," as all three defendants were tried simultaneously before the same jury and
found guilty of the underlying offense).
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Alternatively, defendant claims that even if the Neder standard applies, in order to
find an instructional error harmless under Neder, "the missing element must be
'supported by uncontroverted evidence/" Aplt. Br. at 24 (quoting Neder, 119 S.Ct. at
1830). Defendant further claims that the evidence of her accomplice liability here was
controverted and that she is therefore entitled to reversal under Neder. Aplt. Br. at 25-29.
If defendant is claiming that harmless-error review under Neder is more stringent
than that under Chapman, she is mistaken. Nothing in Neder purports to alter the
reasonable doubt standard of harmless error set forth in Chapman. See Neder, 119 S.Ct.
at 1837 (adopting Chapman standard). To the contrary, Neder acknowledges that
harmless error review
will often require that a reviewing court conduct a thorough examination of
the record. If, at the end of that examination, the court cannot conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same
absent the error-for example, where the defendant contested the omitted
element and raised evidence sufficient to support a contrary finding-it
should not find the error harmless.
Id. at 1838 (emphasis added). Thus, not only must the omitted element be contested, the
controverting evidence must be sufficient to support a contrary finding. Id. at 1836-37.
In any event, evidence of defendant's accomplice liability was essentially
uncontroverted at trial. Defendant did not necessarily deny her participation in the thefts,
but rather claimed that she was too scared not to cooperate with Chastity's requests for
assistance (R. 97:102). Although defendant purported to be scared, trial counsel made
plain that defendant was not claiming her fear rose to the level of duress or coercion such
16

that her involvement in the thefts was excusable on that ground (R. 97:113). See UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 76-2-302 (1999) (excusing criminal liability where coercion or duress is

established). Rather, trial counsel argued that defendant simply failed to report the thefts,
or to otherwise behave as a Good Samaritan (R. 97:129-130).
Despite her claims to the contrary, defendant did more than simply fail to tell on
Chastity. When Chastity asked for assistance in stealing a vehicle, defendant did not tell
her no. Rather, defendant directed Chastity to meet her at the stop sign, which stop sign
was out of the view of the other Alamo employees (R. 97:45-49, 57-58, 69-70). Further,
once the cars were stolen, defendant did not report the thefts, but did put herfingerto her
lips to make a "shhhlT sound when she returned to the check-in area (R. 97:40). She also
told her sister-in-law Angela that Chastity and her cohorts were taking the cars to Las
Vegas and asked Angela not to tell anyone (R. 97:72-73). Finally, when confronted with
the thefts by her employer, defendant initially denied any knowledge of the incident (R.
97:89-90). She acknowledged her involvement only after her employer told her that he
had witnesses to her conduct (id.). Thus, defendant's nominal defense, that she was too
scared not to cooperate with Chastity's requests, can hardly be said to (a) controvert the
State's evidence, let alone to (b) raise sufficient evidence that could rationally lead to a
contrary finding with her regard to her accomplice liability. Neder, 119 S.Ct. at 18381839. Therefore, even assuming some error in the separate elements instructions here, it
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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POINT II
VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY
VERDICT, THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT DEFENDANT
INTENTIONALLY AIDED CHASTITY AND HER COHORTS IN
THE ALAMO RENT-A-CAR THEFTS
In Point II of his brief, defendant alleges that she was merely present at the time of
the Alamo Rent-A-Car thefts; therefore, the evidence is insufficient to establish that she
intentionally aided Chastity in the auto thefts. Aplt. Br. at 33. Because defendant fails to
view the marshaled evidence, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most
favorable to the theft verdict, her claim lacks merit.
In order to succeed on her claim, defendant must marshal the evidence, including
circumstantial evidence, supporting the verdict, then demonstrate that the marshaled
evidence fails to establish that she intentionally aided Chastity in the auto thefts. State v.
Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App. 1991). See also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817
P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991) (holding that 'one challenging the verdict must marshal the
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict"). The appellate court "review[s]
the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most
favorable to the verdict of the jury" and reverses "only when the evidence, so viewed, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbably that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt[.]" State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989). See
also State v. Lemons, 844 P.2d 378, 381 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948
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(Utah 1993). "The existence of contradictory evidence or of conflicting inferences do not
warrant disturbing the jury's verdict." State v. Howell 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982).
Moreover, it is within the exclusive province of the jury to judge the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence. Id.; State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah
App.), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990).
At trial, defendant theorized that she could have used better judgment, and that
ultimately, her conduct did not amount to aiding and abetting (R. 97:125-130). However,
as set out in the previous point, defendant was more than just an idle bystander to the
vehicle thefts. Contrary to defendant's assertion on appeal, there is no hole in the
evidence regarding defendant's intent to aid Chastity in the Alamo Rent-A-Car thefts.
SeeAplt Br. at 33.
Having failed to solicit assistance from Jenniffer or Angela in exchange for
"weed," Chastity turned to defendant (R. 97:31-35, 64-68). Unlike either Jenniffer or
Angela, defendant did not expressly refuse the offer (R. 97:68, 99). Ultimately, defendant
directed Chastity to meet at the stop sign which was out of view of both Jenniffer and
Angela (R. 97:45,49, 57-58). Defendant then drove the soon-to-be-stolen Eclipse toward
the stop sign, to meet Chastity and her cohorts (R. 97:101). Defendant returned the rental
return area few minutes later on foot, and upon seeing Jenniffer, put her finger to lips and
made a "shhhh" sound (R. 97:40, 50, 58). Shortly thereafter, defendant rode home from
work with Angela, and told her that "they" had taken the Eclipse and another vehicle and
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were headed to Las Vegas in the stolen cars (R. 97:72-73). Defendant also asked Angela
not to tell anyone about the thefts (R. 97:73). Significantly, defendant at no time reported
the thefts. Indeed, when asked about the incident by her employer two days later,
defendant initially denied any knowledge of the thefts (R. 97:89-90). Defendant only
admitted that Chastity had stolen the vehicles after her employer confronted her with the
fact that he had witnesses to her own involvement in the thefts (id.).
Based on the above, the jury reasonably rejected defendant's "merely present"
defense to the theft charge. The jury simply did not believe defendant's denials of any
intent to aid in the thefts. That is their prerogative. Howell, 649 P.2d at 97; Jonas, 793
P.2dat905.5
CONCLUSION
Defendant's jury verdict for second degree felony theft should be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on (5_ May 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General
/

•

c

—>

MARIAN DECKER
Assistant Attorney General
5

In Point 11(A) of her brief, defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to
that she acted as a principal in the Alamo vehicle thefts. Aplt. Br. at 31. However, as
pointed out in Points I and II of the State's brief, defendant was convicted under a theory
of accomplice liability (see R. 97:122). Therefore, there is no issue as to defendant's
liability as a principal, and accordingly, no need to address that claim.
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ADDENDUM

INSTRUCTION NO.

You are instructed that the defendant has entered a plea of "Not Guilty" to the charge(s)
contained in the Information. The plea of "Not Guilty" denies each of the essential allegations of
the charge contained in the Information and casts upon the State the burden of proving each of
those essential allegations to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt.

INSTRUCTION NO.

I

Every person, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of the offense who directly commits the offense, who
solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids
another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense
shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct.

INSTRUCTION NO.

U

Although there is more than one person who is named in this
action,

the

case

against

each person

independent of the case of the other.
defendant on trial is Misty Dawn Segura.

is

separate

from and

In this action the onlyYou are not to concern

yourselves with the status of the other person or defendant
named in this case.

INSTRUCTION NO.

U

Before you can convict the defendant, Misty Dawn Segura, of
the offense of Theft as charged in the information, you must
find from all of the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each
and every one of the following elements of that offense:
1.

That on or about the

day of October, 1998, in

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Misty Dawn
Segura,

obtained

or exercised

unauthorized

control

over the

property of another; and
2.

That the defendant did so with the purpose to deprive

the owner thereof; and
3.

That the property was an operable motor vehicle.

If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must

find

the

defendant

guilty

of Theft

as charged

information

scad—yet*—need—not—eoncidor—any—nf

©#f-ense«.

If,

on

the

other

hand,

the

thp

evidence

in the

alternatg\tfl?) 1
does

not

establish beyond a reasonable doubt any one or more of the
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO,

K

All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of innocence, and a
defendant is presumed innocent until he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In case of a
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, a defendant is entitled to an
acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State to prove the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an
absolute certainty. Reasonable doubt is a doubt that is based on reason and one which is
reasonable in view of all of the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the mind, and convinces the
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it, and obviates all reasonable
doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, and it
must arise from the evidence or the lack of evidence in this case.

INSTRUCTION NO.

If, in these instructions, any rule, direction, or idea has been stated in varying ways, no
emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not to
single out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction and ignore the others, but
you are to consider all the instructions as a whole and to regard each in the light of all the others.
The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative
importance.
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